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Editors' Summary 
THE  BROOKINGS PANEL on Economic  Activity  held its sixty-fourth con- 
ference in Washington,  D.C.,  on September 4 and 5,  1997.  This issue 
of Brookings  Papers  includes  the papers and discussions  presented at 
the conference.  The first paper examines  the economic  implications  of 
alternative proposals for reforming the U.S.  social security system. The 
second  analyzes  the  large  increases  in both unemployment  rates and 
capital shares in continental  Europe. The third paper models how gov- 
ernment policies  have  given  rise  to  large  unofficial  sectors  in  some 
transition economies  of central and eastern Europe and the former So- 
viet  Union.  And the fourth assesses  the gains  and costs  likely  to flow 
from European monetary union. 
THE  DESIGNERS  of the U.S.  social  security  system  intended to pro- 
vide a secure and stable retirement program. In the first few decades of 
the system,  a growing  work force and moderate tax increases  allowed 
politicians  to increase the generosity  of benefits.  However,  today the 
projected rise in the ratio of the retired to the working-age  population 
implies  that the current rate of  payroll  taxes  will  not be  adequate to 
cover scheduled benefits in the future. According to the Social Security 
Administration's  official  actuary, based on intermediate projections of 
demographics  and other key variables,  the trust fund balance will  run 
out in the year 2029.  To restore financial balance over a seventy-five- 
year horizon would require an immediate and permanent 2.23  percent- 
age  point  increase  in the payroll  tax.  There has been  no shortage  of 
proposals  for fixing  the social  security  problem,  but none has gained 
wide political  support. Even the Advisory  Council on Social  Security, 
created with the hope that it would agree on a plan that could gain broad 
support, was unable to do so.  In the first paper of this volume,  Peter 
Diamond provides an in-depth discussion  of the political  and economic 
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considerations  that should  inform  any changes  in the  social  security 
system. 
Most  reform proposals  contain  at least  one  of  the following  three 
features: moving rapidly to build a large permanent trust fund, changing 
the trust fund portfolio  to include private securities  along with federal 
debt, and replacing part of the current defined benefit Old-Age,  Surviv- 
ors,  and Disability  Insurance plan with  a defined  contribution  plan. 
Each of these  features has consequences  that are not immediately  ap- 
parent, as they involve  not only redistribution of the expected  tax bur- 
den across income classes  and across generations,  but also reallocation 
of risks about future rates of return. The reforms also have potentially 
important  indirect  effects  on  saving,  the  capital  stock,  and  future 
growth.  One  important contribution  of  Diamond's  paper is  a formal 
analysis  that explicitly  considers  the response of individuals  and firms 
to changes in the system.  Another contribution is the recognition of the 
interplay between politics  and economics  in this arena, which leads him 
to consider the political  response that might arise in future years from 
changes  made to the system today. 
Diamond compares the three proposals put forward by the advisory 
council.  All  address the projected financial problems,  but they differ 
sharply in how  they  would  change  the present system.  The Maintain 
Benefits proposal resembles  the current system but raises taxes to aug- 
ment the trust fund and includes the possibility  of investing  part of the 
fund in private equities.  The Individual Accounts proposal is somewhat 
more innovative,  introducing a defined contribution element: a 1.6 per- 
cent increase  in the payroll tax funds 401(k)-style  accounts for which 
the government  provides  a menu of  available  investments,  including 
equities,  with mandatory annuitization upon retirement. The Personal 
Security  Accounts  proposal  is  most  radical,  allocating  5  percent  of 
payroll taxes to individual defined contribution accounts that resemble 
current individual retirement accounts. 
Diamond  first examines  the idea of raising current taxes to create a 
larger trust fund.  While  future recipients  and taxpayers would  find it 
desirable  to  inherit a larger trust fund,  building  a larger fund would 
require current sacrifice.  How  big  a sacrifice  depends  on  the rate of 
return to saving  and on the rate of  population growth.  To clarify  this 
relationship,  Diamond  uses  a two-period  overlapping  generations 
model.  He focuses  on the effect of a temporary tax increase that is used William  C. Brainard and George L. Perry  xi 
to  increase  the  fund  permanently,  so  that  a  given  stream  of  future 
benefits requires a lower steady-state tax rate. Assuming,  first, that the 
supply of labor is inelastic  and that increases in the capital stock do not 
affect  interest rates or wages,  he shows that the decline  in steady-state 
tax collections  per dollar of increased trust fund is equal to the excess 
of the rate of return on capital over the rate of growth of the labor force 
augmented  by technical  change.  With zero population growth and no 
technical  change,  this is simply the rate of return on capital. But under 
more  realistic  assumptions,  the  growth  in  the effective  (augmented) 
labor force implies a reduction in taxes that is less than the rate of return 
on capital by 2 or 3 percent. 
How much the nation's  capital stock grows depends not only on the 
additions to the fund, but also on the response of the household  sector. 
In the basic  model,  households  are assumed  to arrange their lifetime 
consumption optimally and to take full account of the reduction in future 
payroll taxes.  In the steady state, they save more during their working 
years,  adding further to the capital stock.  However,  Diamond observes 
that the rationale for social  security  is closely  related to the idea that 
many people would not save adequately for retirement without govern- 
ment intervention,  an idea that is supported by the evidence.  This leads 
him to modify the basic model to recognize  that some fraction of house- 
holds do not save at all,  and households  in the aggregate respond less 
than the life-cycle  model assumes.  These modifications  lead to smaller 
increases in private saving and the capital stock and dampen the down- 
ward pressure  on  the rate of  return. In the  limit,  with  no  change  in 
household  saving,  the increase  in the capital stock corresponds to the 
increase in the trust fund itself. 
The calculations  are more complicated  if increasing the capital stock 
by increasing  saving  drives  down  the return on capital and raises the 
wage  rate,  as would  be expected  in a large economy  like  the United 
States.  Lower  interest rates reduce the earnings of  the trust fund and 
higher wages  raise  the  benefits  needed  to  preserve  a given  earnings 
replacement rate for retirees.  Both effects  reduce the return to building 
up the trust fund. But the consequences  for the entire government may 
be different,  because  the decline  in interest costs  also lowers  the cost 
of servicing  government  debt held by the public. 
Diamond observes  that induced changes  in wages  affect income tax 
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capital income  tax revenues,  and, as mentioned  above,  changes  in in- 
terest rates affect the cost of servicing  government debt. He notes that 
it makes a difference  whether changes  such as these,  which arise from 
reforms to social  security,  accrue directly to the fund or to other parts 
of  the government  budget or to individuals,  and calls  attention to the 
potentially  large distributional consequences  of  such effects.  He sug- 
gests that while analysts should take account of such induced increases, 
it would be politically  difficult to capture them for the benefit of social 
security. 
Investment  in the stock  market is  a feature of  many proposals  for 
reform.  Had the  trust fund  invested  in corporate equities  as well  as 
government debt in the past, it would have produced higher returns and 
improved its financial condition.  Given the actual size of the fund, the 
improvement  would  have  been  relatively  minor,  but it could  be  sub- 
stantial if  a large,  permanent trust fund were created.  Diamond  notes 
that a shift  toward equity  in the trust portfolio  would  have important 
effects  on actuarial calculations  of the condition  of the trust fund long 
before the shift produced actual changes  in the fund. If social  security 
were in actuarial balance before the shift,  and if historical returns were 
used to project the future,  social  security would  move  to an actuarial 
surplus. Such a projected surplus could be spent in a variety of ways- 
to raise  the benefits  or reduce the taxes  of  current generations,  or to 
benefit future workers and retirees. 
Diamond  points  out that the improved  actuarial position  comes  at 
the  cost  of  increased  risk,  to be  borne by  future taxpayers  who  will 
have  to  adjust to greater fluctuations  in portfolio  returns. Thus inter- 
generational redistribution depends on the allocation of risk, as well  as 
on the expected  allocation  of taxes and benefits.  The paucity of theo- 
retical  analysis  of  these  issues  leads Diamond to construct a series  of 
stylized overlapping generation models that illuminate the way in which 
the portfolio  allocation  of the fund affects risk-sharing both within and 
across generations. 
Because  risk-sharing  is  a central issue  in considering  the effect  of 
equity  investment,  Diamond  makes risk in the returns to both capital 
and labor the central feature of the model.  The overlapping generations 
model  exposes  the  incompleteness  of  private  markets-their  inade- 
quacy  in allocating  resources  into the future-and  suggests  that gov- 
ernment  intervention  can  accomplish  Pareto  improvements.  But  the William  C. Brainard  and George L. Perry  xiii 
importance of the incompleteness  depends in subtle ways on the struc- 
ture of the economy.  For example,  if the production function is Cobb- 
Douglas,  technology  affects the interest rate and the wage rate propor- 
tionately,  so that there is  some  risk-sharing between  the young,  who 
rely on wages,  and the old,  who rely on capital,  even  without govern- 
ment  involvement.  However  in general,  when  returns to capital  and 
labor are not perfectly correlated, the risk-sharing across generations is 
suboptimal.  Diamond  explains  how  government  ownership  of  capital 
can improve the allocation  of risk. To acquire capital,  the government 
in effect engages  in an "open market operation,"  issuing risk-free debt 
and purchasing equities.  The old,  holding  additional risk-free govern- 
ment debt, then have less risk and the government has more. In response 
to unexpectedly  high or low  returns, the government  must adjust ex- 
penditures or taxes to preserve the government balance.  Assuming  that 
such adjustments mainly affect the young,  the government effectively 
removes  risk  from  the  old  and  allocates  it  to  the  contemporaneous 
young. 
Would such a reallocation  of risk represent an improvement in wel- 
fare? Even in the basic,  representative agent model the answer is am- 
biguous.  Without equities  in the trust fund,  future wage  earners still 
bear the risk  of  servicing  existing  government  debt out of  uncertain 
incomes; investing in equities would add to their risks. More important, 
the representative  agent model  ignores the fact that a large fraction of 
the public has no investment in equities  and a sizable fraction has little 
or no personally controlled financial assets. To illustrate the significance 
of this heterogeneity,  Diamond analyzes the effect of a portfolio change 
in a mandatory defined  contribution  system.  In this system,  not only 
are the "nonsavers"'  forced to save,  but the risk and return properties 
of their savings  are mandated. Savers, by contrast, can undo the effects 
of the mandatory contribution and its allocation  by adjusting their per- 
sonal portfolios.  A key  issue  in assessing  the effect  on the welfare  of 
individuals  is  whether  the  nonsavers  are more  risk  averse  than  the 
savers.  As  to  the  effects  on  investment,  if  the  fund  portfolio  adds 
equities,  the pool of individuals  who are sharing the risks in the econ- 
omy is broadened,  which should reduce the risk premium and increase 
capital formation. 
Diamond  also considers  the effects  of reform on labor market deci- 
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partially individual (that is, defined contribution) system would improve 
the efficiency  of the labor market by tightening the links between taxes 
and benefits.  Diamond notes that the distortionary effects  of mandatory 
saving for either defined benefit or individual accounts depend both on 
an individual's  place  in the income  distribution and on the design  of 
the plans' redistributive features.  For some individuals,  the distortions 
from an individual  account can actually be greater than they are from 
social  security.  For example,  for an individual who does not care about 
bequests,  the  assets  accumulated  in  an individual  account  are of  no 
value  if he dies  before  retirement,  and the annuity that he receives  if 
he does retire is unaffected by the possibility  of early death. In a defined 
benefit plan,  the actuarial returns to his saving  in fact are higher,  be- 
cause they do reflect the possibility  of early death. 
How much choice should individuals have in the use of their savings? 
The mandatory annuitization of benefits under social  security prevents 
individuals  from  spending  their  savings  rapidly  or outliving  the  re- 
sources available for retirement. The advisory council's  Individual Ac- 
counts  plan  also  requires  annuitization,  although  it  allows  a choice 
between  single  and joint life annuities. The Personal Security Accounts 
plan leaves  the choice  up to the individual  and the opportunities  pro- 
vided  in the private annuity market. Diamond  points out that several 
questions  bear on the issue of individual choice.  To what extent would 
individuals  annuitize voluntarily? How would annuities be priced,  and 
how  competitive  would  rates be? Would  private markets provide  in- 
dexed  annuities? For those  who do not annuitize,  how quickly  would 
they  spend down  wealth  and how  would  this affect  the long-lived  el- 
derly,  widows  and widowers,  and other recipients of bequests? 
Although  hard answers  to  these  questions  are not  available,  Dia- 
mond's educated guesses  leave him skeptical of the free choice  market 
solution.  He observes  that the private annuity market is poorly devel- 
oped and expresses  concern about individuals'  lack of understanding of 
risk,  of the difference  between  real and nominal contracts,  and of an- 
nuities themselves.  He concludes  that some mandatory annuitization of 
individual  accounts  would be desirable,  even  though it would prevent 
individuals from using their resources for bequests,  or to buffer random 
events.  He  also  sees  potential  risks to  widows  and other dependents 
from  allowing  wage  earners to  make unconstrained  choices  between 
single  and joint  annuities.  As evidence,  he cites  the dramatic changes William  C. Brainard and George L. Perry  xv 
in the choice  of plans that occurred after policyholders  were required 
to  get  notarized  spousal  approval  before  selection  of  a single-life 
annuity. 
Political  feasibility  is a key element  in the formation of policy,  and 
Diamond discusses  how it enters the social  security debate.  For exam- 
ple,  proponents  of  individual  accounts  argue that they  would  make 
needed  tax increases  more likely.  Diamond  acknowledges  this possi- 
bility,  but suggests  that the case  is not strong, both because  the popu- 
larity of the existing  system  makes a tax increase earmarked for social 
security more likely than tax increases generally,  and because the major 
structural change required to introduce individual accounts runs the risk 
of  delaying  all  action.  Diamond  also  considers  how  changes  in  the 
system are likely to affect future political decisions.  His rich discussion 
ranges from the way  pressures for benefit increases  might depend on 
the  size  of  the  fund balance  and on  what part of  it is  earmarked for 
individuals  to  the  stability  of  political  support of  the  social  security 
system  in the future under the alternatives currently being discussed. 
Diamond urges economists  to distinguish the essential elements  of a 
particular plan  from  features  that could  be  incorporated in any one. 
Under the Individual Accounts  plan proposed by the advisory council, 
the  payments  required to  meet  accrued  unfunded  liabilities  owed  to 
earlier generations  come  entirely from the payroll tax destined for the 
defined benefit part of the system;  nothing comes  from the portion of 
the tax destined for the defined contribution plan, and so there appears 
to be  a superior return on those  accounts.  He  suggests  that a part of 
both taxes should be used to cover the redistribution to earlier genera- 
tions.  Diamond also worries that moving to a defined contribution plan 
would threaten the redistribution within generations in the current sys- 
tem because,  as the relative  size  of  the defined benefit portion of  the 
system  shrinks,  the  redistributive  burden placed  on  it  increases.  He 
suggests  that even the nature of reporting may affect the popularity of 
plans: the natural way  of  describing  accrued benefits-the  projected 
flow  of  benefits-may  appear less  impressive  than the  accumulated 
wealth in a defined contribution plan that would support the same benefit 
flow. 
Diamond  reflects  on the ongoing  political  forces  that will  operate 
after the present system is amended.  A key issue in comparing defined 
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prises.  Ideally,  benefit formulas and taxes should be moved gradually, 
with  considerable  lead time  to allow  individuals  to adapt to changed 
circumstances.  Diamond  believes  that a large defined benefit system, 
particularly if it has a large trust fund, has an inherent advantage in its 
ability to smooth  interest rate risk over successive  cohorts of retirees. 
Contrary to  some,  he  does  not  believe  that individual  accounts  are 
immune to political  risk.  He notes that although such accounts would 
be protected as private property, there is a history of change in the tax 
treatment of tax-favored  retirement accounts,  and a large pool of tax- 
favored  accumulations  will  always  be a potential target for increased 
taxation.  Some day, the government might require that people draw on 
their individual  accounts before they can receive  unemployment bene- 
fits.  And  individualized  accounts  would  not  insulate  taxpayers  from 
calls  for help in the event  that the stock market collapsed  and returns 
to individual  accounts were very poor. 
The current system  is of  long  standing,  mature, and very popular, 
and it  is  reasonable  to  think  of  it  as  being  in  political  equilibrium. 
Diamond believes  that changes in the system may affect public percep- 
tions and upset this equilibrium.  Social  security is now thought of as a 
retirement income  system,  and it is considered  appropriate that some 
people pay taxes and do not live to collect benefits. Individual accounts 
would  create a different  sense  of ownership.  With such accounts,  in- 
dividuals  would  have greater choice  in how they use the accumulated 
funds in retirement, but it would also be natural for account owners to 
call for early access to cover expenses  such as care for terminal illness, 
home purchase, or education.  It would not be surprising if these forces 
gradually  eroded  social  security's  guarantee of  funds  for retirement. 
Diamond  feels  that this is likely  to affect significantly  the distribution 
of  income  among the elderly.  Given  the high level  of  poverty among 
elderly widows  under the current social security system,  this is a source 
of great concern.  He urges that major reform should not be undertaken 
without careful attention to the distributional consequences  and should 
not  undermine  the  security  that the  system  currently provides  to  all 
retirees. 
Two  STRIKING  MACROECONOMIC  changes  have  occurred  in  the 
economies  of continental Europe over the past twenty-five  years. One, 
a long rise in unemployment  rates, is widely  recognized.  The other,  a William  C. Brainard and George L. Perry  xvii 
historic increase in capital's  share of output since the early  1980s,  has 
received  little notice.  These developments  are markedly different from 
the paths of unemployment  and income  shares in other advanced econ- 
omies.  While  there has been  extensive  discussion  of  the reasons  for 
Europe's  rising  unemployment,  no one  has  integrated those  findings 
with the changes  in capital's  share.  In the second  paper of this issue, 
Olivier Blanchard presents a model of employment,  output, and capital 
accumulation  that provides such an explanation. 
Blanchard begins by examining  the extent to which factor quantities 
can account  for the evolution  of  factor prices  and income  shares.  He 
makes the standard assumptions that production has constant returns to 
scale  and labor  is  paid  its  marginal  product,  and also  assumes  that 
technological  change  is Harrod-neutral (labor-augmenting).  Using  ac- 
tual capital stock and employment  data for fourteen member countries 
of  the  Organisation  for  Economic  Co-operation  and Development 
(OECD)  over  varying  periods  between  the  late  1960s  and  1995,  he 
estimates  Solow  residuals for each country and uses them to construct 
estimates  of  the  efficiency  of  labor.  He  then uses  these  estimates  to 
calculate  employment  in efficiency  units and the corresponding  wage 
per efficiency  unit. 
Blanchard applies  these  estimates  in several  ways.  On the basis  of 
the  evolution  of  capital  shares,  he  classifies  each  country  as  either 
Continental or Anglo-Saxon-slight  misnomers, since the former group 
includes  Australia and Ireland, and the latter, comprising  Canada, the 
United  States,  and the United  Kingdom,  is ethnically  diverse.  A plot 
of  the  average  factor  price  and factor  quantity  ratios  for  these  two 
country groups is revealing.  Up to the early  1980s,  labor in efficiency 
units decreased markedly relative to capital in the Continental countries. 
Given this capital deepening,  it is not surprising that the profit rate fell 
relative  to  the  wage  during  this  period,  although  the  capital  share 
showed  little  trend.  Thereafter,  capital  deepening  continued  but the 
profit rate rose relative  to the wage  rate. As  a consequence,  capital's 
share rose  dramatically,  substantially  exceeding  its  level  in  1970.  In 
the Anglo-Saxon  countries,  by  contrast,  both factor price  and factor 
quantity ratios showed  little trend. 
Blanchard analyzes  these phenomena more formally,  regressing  log 
factor price ratios on log relative factor inputs for both the Anglo-Saxon 
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dummies.  For both samples,  the implied elasticity  of factor substitution 
is not significantly  different from 1.0,  indicating that changes in factor 
proportions cannot explain the shifts in shares over time. The series of 
time dummies  for the Continental countries show a marked decline  in 
the  1970s  and a steady and substantial rise since  the early  1980s; the 
time dummies for the Anglo-Saxon  countries, while they show substan- 
tial  cyclical  variation,  show  no  trend.  Blanchard  tries  a  number of 
econometric variations-allowing  elasticities  to differ across countries, 
reversing the direction of the regression,  and using lagged values of the 
factor ratio as instruments-but  none of these  alters his basic  finding 
of a shift in the relationship between factor prices and factor intensities 
for the Continental  countries  that is  not evident  for the Anglo-Saxon 
countries. 
Blanchard considers several possible  interpretations of these results. 
One is that the shift in the relationship between factor prices and quan- 
tities,  and the  corresponding  increase  in  capital  shares,  is  simply  a 
compositional  effect.  The factor price equalization  theorem is  an ex- 
treme form of  this hypothesis.  This theory says  that factor prices  are 
determined in world markets and differences  in factor ratios are accom- 
modated by a differing  mix of industries with different factor intensi- 
ties.  However,  Blanchard reports results for France that suggest  capi- 
tal's share increase in nearly all tradable sectors,  so that the theory does 
not  provide  a satisfactory  explanation.  Another  possibility,  which  is 
hard either to confirm or to reject directly,  is that a stable relationship 
exists  between factor prices and factor quantities, but it has longer lags 
and much more complicated  dynamics  than can be captured in Blan- 
chard's  basic  regression.  For example,  it could  be that factor propor- 
tions  are largely  embodied  in existing  capital,  leading  firms to take a 
long  time to respond to the adverse labor supply shocks of the  1970s. 
As firms have gradually shifted to less labor-intensive technologies,  the 
ratio of  labor to  capital  has  declined  steadily,  but profits have  only 
improved gradually,  as the new technologies  have taken over. 
Still another possible explanation is that the improvement in capital's 
share simply reflects a change in the distribution of rents between work- 
ers and firms. Blanchard considers two variations of this idea: a change 
in the markup of price over marginal cost and a change in wage-setting. 
He  finds the first variation implausible,  because  the period  since  the William  C. Brainard  and George L. Perry  xix 
early  1980s has been characterized by increased,  not decreased,  com- 
petition,  especially  in continental  Europe.  He  finds it more plausible 
that as unions have become  less powerful in the Continental countries, 
the wage  rate has decreased relative to the marginal product of  labor. 
A variant of this view is that in the early 1980s firms had chronic excess 
employment,  which  they  gradually  shed  as  unions  became  weaker. 
Blanchard's  final candidate  for the shifts  in the relationship  between 
factor prices  and factor  quantities  is  biased  technological  change,  as 
opposed  to changes  in market structure. In this explanation,  the em- 
phasis  is on  induced  bias: Continental  firms develop  and adopt tech- 
nologies  that use  less  labor and more capital  at a given  wage  rental 
ratio. 
Blanchard builds  a simple  model  that incorporates  these  potential 
explanations  of  factor  prices,  quantities,  and  shares  and provides  a 
framework  for  assessing  their  importance.  In this  model,  firms  are 
monopolistically  competitive,  facing  a constant  elasticity  of  demand 
with production functions  that exhibit  a constant elasticity  of substitu- 
tion.  They are forward looking  and face costs of adjusting labor inten- 
sity.  Each firm has one  unit of  capital,  and the capital  stock  evolves 
with the entry and exit of firms. Entry and exit depend on the compar- 
ison  of  the value  of  a going  enterprise with the cost  of  acquiring the 
capital required to operate it. The relative price of capital itself depends 
on the rate of capital accumulation,  and therefore on the rate of entry 
of  firms. The interest rate, and in steady state the cost  of  capital,  are 
exogenous  and fixed. On the supply side,  the elasticity  of the wage rate 
with respect to employment  is unitary. 
This setup allows  Blanchard to analyze the effects  of each potential 
shock-a  shift in labor supply,  an increase in the markup, and biased 
technological  change.  Drawing on a broad range of empirical work, he 
chooses  values  of the various parameters of the model that both seem 
sensible  and give  a reasonable description of the economy  in the mod- 
el's  steady  state.  Since  the elasticity  of  substitution plays  a key role, 
he tries two  values:  an elasticity  of  1,  as suggested  by the empirical 
estimates  above,  and an elasticity  of  2,  which  gives  more scope  for 
changing  capital's  share with  changes  in factor  prices.  The costs  of 
adjustment of labor intensity and the capital stock are crucial to the lags 
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4.8  years in the adjustment of factor intensities  to their long-run values 
and an elasticity  of  investment  with  respect  to  the  relative  price  of 
capital of  1, somewhat  higher than most empirical estimates. 
There are no major qualitative  surprises in the response of the styl- 
ized economy  to shocks,  but the magnitudes and timing are informative. 
An unexpected  and permanent adverse shock to the labor supply imply- 
ing a 10 percent increase in the real wage at a given level of unemploy- 
ment initially  decreases the profit rate and capital share. Firms shift out 
of labor over time,  leading to a gradual decrease in the ratio of labor to 
capital,  and there is a net exodus  of firms. As firms shift out of expen- 
sive  labor,  and as the capital  stock declines,  the profit rate gradually 
recovers.  In the long run, since the profit rate must return to its initial 
value, the wage rate also does so, and employment and the capital stock 
decrease  by about  10 percent.  With the lags  that Blanchard assumes, 
this  pattern of  adjustments  is  not a bad description  of  events  on the 
Continent,  except  that even  with an elasticity  of substitution of 2,  the 
share of capital never rises much above its initial value. 
An unexpected  and permanent increase in markup, a negative  shock 
to labor demand,  also reduces employment  over the medium term, but 
is  accompanied  by  increases  in  unemployment  and decreases  in  the 
wage rate. Higher profits, arising from both the greater markup and the 
depressed  wage,  induce  entry.  In the long  run,  as in the case  of  the 
labor supply shock,  the wage and profit rates must return to their initial 
levels,  but with less labor per firm, more capital,  and more firms. With 
Blanchard's  parameter values,  the long-run increase in capital's  share 
is substantial: about 6 percentage points with a unit elasticity  of substi- 
tution,  and near 8 percentage points for an elasticity  of 2.  Although  it 
takes time  to reach the full  effects,  capital's  share increases  substan- 
tially  over  a horizon of eight  to ten quarters. Unemployment  is much 
more sluggish:  after seven  years it has only  returned about a third of 
the  way.  A  biased  technological  shock,  which  Blanchard models  by 
changing the "share"  coefficient  in the production function,  generates 
virtually  the same  dynamics  as an increase  in the markup, making  it 
difficult  to  choose  between  the  two  in explaining  the  Continental 
experience. 
Having  demonstrated  that some  combination  of  labor supply  and 
labor demand shocks can generate the stylized  Continental experience, 
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Focusing  on France, he constructs estimates  of the shifts in the crucial 
equations  of the model.  In the case of labor supply,  this involves  cal- 
culating  the difference  between  the wage  in efficiency  units  and the 
wage  implied  by the unemployment  rate.  Blanchard tries three alter- 
native values for the wage elasticity  and adjusts the equation so that the 
error is zero in 1970. He recognizes  that the resulting estimates include 
substantial specification error, since the true labor supply equation must 
have  richer dynamics  and include  many more variables  than he  pro- 
vides.  But  he  believes  that the  estimated  shocks  give  a  reasonable 
picture of the distance of the wage from the level,  which,  in the absence 
of  other shifts,  would  allow  the economy  to return to its  1970 unem- 
ployment  level.  All three series show the wage increasing much faster 
than measured total factor productivity  after the early  1970s,  peaking 
relative to productivity in the early 1980s,  and subsequently declining. 
For the  intermediate case,  with  an elasticity  of  1, the wage  peaks  at 
about  15 percent  above  its  initial  level,  and the  subsequent  decline 
leaves  it more than 5 percent above its initial level. 
Blanchard  sees  no  mystery  about what  lies  behind  these  develop- 
ments: oil  price increases,  not offset  by lower  real wage  growth,  are 
the source of the initial shift; and the subsequent unemployment  itself 
is the source of  institutional  changes  that have made the labor market 
more rigid, protecting employed  workers against the risk of unemploy- 
ment and improving  the welfare  of  the unemployed.  And he believes 
that these  institutional  changes,  as well  as the marginalization  of  the 
long-term  unemployed,  which  reduces  their weight  in wage  determi- 
nation, are the reasons why the initial shifts have not been fully undone, 
despite  the fact  that relative  oil  prices  have  returned to  1970s  levels 
and workers  have  adjusted  their  expectations  to  the  poor  economic 
performance. 
Blanchard's  calculations  of  the shifts  in the demand for labor,  as- 
sumed to  be  the result  of  a change  in markup, are performed in the 
same  style  but  are more  complicated.  In the  absence  of  adjustment 
costs,  the elasticity  of demand is implied by the wage  and factor pro- 
portions,  given  the  production  function  and profit maximization.  He 
takes  account  of  adjustment  costs  by  assuming  that factor  demands 
depend on an exponentially  distributed lag of actual wages.  He calcu- 
lates  the  implied  shifts  for  two  elasticities  of  substitution  and three 
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adjustment there is  little  movement  in markup during the  1970s  and 
early  1980s,  and all of  the parameter values  imply  a sharp rise in the 
markup since the mid-1980s.  Blanchard notes that in some models,  the 
results are observationally  equivalent to assuming that the shifts in labor 
demand arise from technological  shifts biased in favor of capital. 
Using  these estimates  of the shifts in labor demand and supply,  and 
a constructed time series of the user costs of capital,  Blanchard applies 
his model to simulate the French economy  over the sample period.  He 
assumes  rational expectations,  with future shift variables expected  to 
be equal  to their current value.  The simulations  are quite successful. 
When he  allows  for shifts  in labor supply  and the cost  of  capital but 
ignores shifts in labor demand, the model does a good job of explaining 
the increase in unemployment  and the behavior of profit share until the 
mid-1980s,  but does not explain the subsequent increase in unemploy- 
ment and growth in capital's  share.  The estimated  shifts  in labor de- 
mand,  while  they do not disturb the fit in the first part of the sample, 
do  help  to  explain  subsequent  developments.  The  importance  of  the 
demand shock is evident; despite the fact that the wage rate eventually 
falls  below  its  initial  value,  the  simulated  ratio  of  labor  to  capital 
declines  throughout the period, just as it does in the actual economy. 
Blanchard carries out the same exercise  mechanically  for the other 
countries in his sample.  The model does about as well at explaining  the 
evolution  of  unemployment  in  Germany  and the  Netherlands  as  in 
France,  and performs  passably  for  several  other  countries.  Interest- 
ingly,  in Germany most of the decrease and later recovery of the capital 
share  appears to  be  accounted  for  simply  by  the  response  of  factor 
proportions to factor prices.  For the entire country sample,  the cross- 
country correlation between predicted and actual changes in unemploy- 
ment is 0.60  through 1981,  and (excluding  Canada) 0.65  in the rest of 
the period.  But for a large number of countries,  the model overpredicts 
the increase  in the unemployment  rate from  1970 to  1981.  The worst 
of these  cases  are Austria,  with a predicted increase of  13 percentage 
points  and an actual increase  of  only  1 point,  and Spain.  Blanchard 
believes  that part of the explanation for these particular overpredictions 
is that the model assumes that these countries were on their steady-state 
growth paths in  1970,  which  is unlikely  to have been correct. He also 
thinks that data problems are responsible  for the gross overpredictions 
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Recognizing  the important role of the dynamics of labor demand in 
his simulations,  Blanchard conducts panel regressions of factor propor- 
tions on a distributed lag of wages,  including time and country effects. 
The results confirm his earlier presumptions. There is evidence  of long 
lags  in  the  response  of  factor proportions  to  wage  changes,  and the 
implied  elasticity  of  substitution  is a little  less  than 1. Even allowing 
for this richer lag structure, the time dummies remain highly significant 
for the Continental countries but are only marginally significant for the 
Anglo-Saxon  countries.  Blanchard notes that it would also be desirable 
to know whether the source of the shift in labor demand is technological 
bias away from labor or change in the distribution of rents. In principle, 
it  should  be  possible  to  detect  the  difference,  since  changes  in  the 
distribution  of  rents  should  not  show  up as  shifts  in  the  production 
function,  whereas changes  in technological  bias should do so.  Unfor- 
tunately,  Blanchard is unable to distinguish  between  the two with the 
available data. 
Blanchard's  paper leaves  many important and intriguing questions. 
What is the precise source of the labor demand shifts? Is there a causal 
connection behind the apparent correlation across countries between the 
magnitudes of the labor supply shifts in the 1970s and the labor demand 
shifts  in the  1980s  and 1990s? And is there an integrated explanation 
for the apparent shift in the demand for skilled  and unskilled  labor in 
the Anglo-Saxon  countries and the apparent shift from labor to capital 
on  the  Continent?  But whatever  the  answers  to  these  questions,  his 
findings  do  not  present  an optimistic  outlook  for  unemployment  in 
continental Europe. While is true that the adverse effects  of past labor 
supply shocks will disappear over time with the entry of new firms and 
growth in capital,  the adjustment is likely  to be extremely  slow.  The 
Continental countries will face difficult policy choices in the foreseeable 
future. 
T H  E E  C 0 N 0 M  I E  S of  central  and eastern  Europe  and the  former  Soviet 
Union (FSU) have had widely  different experiences  in their transitions 
from communism to capitalism.  Since central planning collapsed,  caus- 
ing dislocations  that brought immediate downturns in economic  activ- 
ity, some countries have been far more successful  than others in estab- 
lishing  market economies  and achieving  economic  recovery.  In many 
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unofficial  sectors,  in which  firms avoid  official  taxes  and regulations 
and whose  output generally  is not measured in official  statistics.  In the 
third article  of  this  volume,  Simon  Johnson,  Daniel  Kaufmann,  and 
Andrei  Shleifer  examine  how  the interplay of  politics  and economic 
incentives  influences the growth of unofficial sectors,  and how the size 
of these unofficial  sectors affects  economic  performance. 
The authors first provide a simple  model of the incentives  that lead 
firms to  choose  between  operating  in  the  official  and the  unofficial 
sectors,  explaining  why  one  sector  grows  relative  to  the  other.  The 
government imposes taxes and regulations on firms in the official sector 
and from its revenues  provides  public  goods,  such as law  and order, 
that increase  the productivity  of  those  firms.  Firms in the  unofficial 
sector  neither pay official  taxes  nor share in these  public  goods,  but 
instead pay private agencies-  "the mafia" -for  contract enforcement 
and protection  from thieves.  In the model,  the government  does  not 
directly  fight the mafia or restrict the movement  of  firms into the un- 
official  sector.  Rather, it competes  with the mafia through the combi- 
nation of tax rates and regulations that it imposes  and the services  that 
it provides.  Under some conditions,  the only stable equilibria are those 
in which  all  resources  locate  in one  sector,  either the official  or the 
unofficial. 
The authors recognize  that some  firms choose  to operate in one or 
the other sector for reasons outside  this simplest  model.  For example, 
firms dealing  extensively  with the state will  want to be in the official 
sector and firms infringing on patents will  want to be in the unofficial 
sector. Allowing  for such differences  among firms explains how official 
and unofficial sectors may coexist,  with individual firms deciding where 
to operate on the basis of which sector offers  them the most attractive 
combination  of  tax  rates,  regulation,  and public  goods.  Adding  the 
plausible assumption that the official  sector is potentially more produc- 
tive  at generating  public  goods,  their model  implies  that economies 
with  small  unofficial  sectors  will  have  superior overall  performance. 
Allowing  for elastic labor supply strengthens this implication,  since bad 
combinations  of  official  taxes  and public  goods  not  only  reallocate 
resources to the unofficial  sector, but reduce real wages and the overall 
labor supply. 
Johnson,  Kaufmann,  and Shleifer  turn to cross-section  analysis  of 
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relevant  data from  a number of  sources.  As  output in the  unofficial 
sector is not captured in officially  measured GDP,  they estimate  total 
GDP from electricity  consumption  and calculate  the output of the un- 
official  sector as the difference  between total GDP and measured GDP. 
In their calculations,  they use existing  estimates of the marginal output 
elasticity  of  energy  consumption  for three subsets  of  transition econ- 
omies:  0.9  for the central and eastern European countries,  1.0 for the 
Baltic countries,  and 1. 15 for the rest of the former Soviet  Union.  For 
the seventeen  countries  for which data are available,  they apply these 
elasticities  to the growth of energy consumption to estimate the growth 
rates of total output. And they use existing  estimates of the share of the 
unofficial  economy  in each  country  in  1989  (which  they  take as the 
prereform base year) to calculate  total GDP levels  through 1995. 
These  calculations  reveal substantial variation in the size of the un- 
official  sectors  in different transition economies,  as well  as important 
differences  in both levels  and growth rates of total GDP compared with 
official GDP. Between  1989 and 1995, the relative size of the unofficial 
sector changes  only  slightly  in the average eastern European country, 
rising  from  17 to  19 percent of  total GDP.  By  contrast,  the average 
share rises from 12 percent to 34 percent in the countries of the former 
Soviet  Union.  As  a consequence,  total GDP growth is little  different 
from official  GDP  growth  in the eastern  European economies  but is 
substantially greater than official  GDP growth for most FSU countries. 
For Russia  in  1995,  total GDP  is 74  percent of  its  1989  level,  while 
official  GDP is only 49 percent of its  1989 level. 
To quantify the relative costs and benefits of operating in the official 
economy,  the  authors  turn to  an array of  indicators  from  outside 
sources.  Each falls  into one of two categories.  The first includes  mea- 
sures of liberalization,  privatization,  deregulation,  corruption, and tax 
fairness.  The  second  measures  characteristics  of  the  legal  environ- 
ment-legal  safeguards for investment,  the rule of law,  and the exten- 
siveness  and effectiveness  of legal  systems  in protecting investment- 
the public goods  most relevant to their model.  Many of these measures 
are subjective and difficult to quantify. However,  the authors show that 
their analysis is quite robust over the broad range of indicators that they 
use.  Cross-country  regressions,  from which  the authors omit  Belarus 
and Uzbekistan  on the grounds that their repressive  governments  pre- 
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vatization,  fairer taxation,  and fewer  regulations,  as well  as a better 
legal environment,  are all associated with a smaller unofficial economy. 
A dummy variable indicates  that the former Soviet  states have  larger 
unofficial  sectors than these variables would predict. 
The authors next examine  how the change  in output between  1989 
and  1995  is  related  to  their  indicators.  In univariate  cross-country 
regressions  explaining  the change  in official  output, each indicator of 
state control and the legal environment has a large and significant coef- 
ficient.  Both the FSU dummy and the initial (first reform year) change 
in output are also  significant  when either is added to the regressions. 
Thus the same factors that are positively  correlated with the size of the 
official  sector  are positively  correlated with  growth  in official  GDP. 
The results of parallel regressions  explaining  total GDP are quite dif- 
ferent.  The  coefficients  on the indicators are smaller  and are usually 
insignificant  when  either the FSU  dummy or initial  output change  is 
included.  This is consistent  with resources being equally productive in 
both sectors.  The state control and legal environment measures predict 
the movement  of  resources  into the official  sector  and the growth  in 
output in that sector,  but have no correlation with total output.  How- 
ever,  the results are not strong and do not rule out the possibility  that 
the official  sector  is  more efficient  than the unofficial  sector in these 
economies. 
Finally,  the authors explore the correlations between macroeconomic 
stabilization  and their measures of official,  unofficial,  and total output. 
Regressions  indicate  that large  unofficial  sectors  are associated  with 
larger deficits  and higher inflation.  They also show that higher official 
output is associated  with smaller deficits and lower inflation. However, 
deficits have no relation to their measure of total output, and the effect 
of inflation on total output is modest and usually insignificant. 
Johnson,  Kaufmann,  and Shleifer  turn from their statistical  results 
to discuss the characteristics of particular transition economies  and draw 
inferences  about their prospects  and ways to improve them. They dis- 
tinguish three broad types of economy.  The first includes those that are 
politically  repressed,  with distortionary taxes,  poor provision of public 
goods,  and yet small unofficial economies.  Belarus and Uzbekistan are 
in this group.  The second  includes  those with relatively  fair taxes and 
regulation,  high tax revenues,  and adequate provision of public goods. 
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third group includes  those  with major tax distortions,  onerous regula- 
tion,  low  tax revenues  and poor provision  of public goods.  The coun- 
tries of  the FSU  dominate  this group,  and they generally  have  larger 
unofficial  sectors and have experienced  slower growth than the eastern 
European nations.  The  authors share the  widely  held  belief  that the 
nations of eastern Europe are on their way to eventual convergence  with 
the economies  of western Europe. The policy challenge for the countries 
of the former Soviet  Union  is how to build institutions  that support a 
large official  market economy.  They see this as the way to avoid a bad 
equilibrium of the sort that arises in their model when the official  sector 
is unattractive to firms. 
Although  foreign  assistance  has helped Russia and some other tran- 
sition  economies  to achieve  macroeconomic  stability,  the authors do 
not see this as the key to the further reforms that are needed.  And they 
are not optimistic  about the prospects of countries whose  ruling elites 
are under  no  pressure  to  reform-such  as  Ukraine,  Tajikistan,  and 
Turkmenistan,  as  well  as  Belarus  and  Uzbekistan,  where  political 
repression stands in the way of the development  of market economies. 
They  see  better  prospects  for  Georgia  and  Azerbaijan,  which  have 
achieved some political stability,  and especially  for Russia, where there 
appears to be a growing consensus  on the need for institutional reforms. 
In Russia,  the authors believe,  reforms must focus on providing law 
and order, reducing  marginal tax rates,  simplifying  tax rules,  and re- 
vising  the federal system  so as to create incentives  for more effective 
local  governance.  They regard such measures as easy to prescribe but 
politically  difficult to achieve.  Although the government of Boris Yelt- 
sin seems committed to reform, Johnson,  Kaufmann, and Shleifer note 
that there is little  agreement between  it and the parliament about spe- 
cifics,  and they  see  no assurance that any reforms that are instituted 
will be as market-friendly as those implemented in eastern Europe. But 
they also observe that considerable improvement is possible  even with- 
out  institutional  perfection  and they  are cautiously  optimistic  about 
Russia's  economic  and political  future. 
IT  SEEMS  VIRTUALLY  certain  that  the  initial  membership  of  the 
European Economic  and Monetary Union (EMU) will be decided in the 
spring of  1998  and EMU  will  be  launched  at the  start of  1999.  Its 
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sovereign  nations and, its proponents believe,  it will  contribute to ad- 
vancing prosperity and political  unity across Europe. Yet the prospects 
for economic  performance under EMU are viewed  skeptically  by many 
economists,  and  the  enthusiasm  for  EMU  among  politicians  is  not 
shared by the voters in most European countries.  In the fourth paper of 
this volume,  Maurice Obstfeld  offers  a critical review  of the case  for 
monetary union in Europe. He evaluates the arguments for and against 
monetary union,  including  its likely  impact on economic  performance, 
and discusses  the still  unsettled  issue  of  the scope  for national  fiscal 
policy  by EMU members. 
German chancellor  Helmut  Kohl  and other  political  leaders  have 
stressed the importance of monetary union for furthering political unity 
among the nations of Europe.  Obstfeld traces the origins of the desire 
for political  unity supported by economic  integration back to the Mar- 
shall Plan,  which was announced in June 1947,  and to several institu- 
tions that were established  over the following  decade.  These  were the 
Organisation for European Economic Co-operation-subsequently,  the 
Organisation  for Economic  Co-operation  and Development-which 
promoted the liberalization  of trade and current account payments; the 
European Payments  Union,  which  provided a clearinghouse  for trade 
within  Europe; and the European Coal  and Steel  Community,  which 
created  a common  market in basic  materials  that resolved  historical 
conflicts  between Germany and France over resources along their com- 
mon  border.  In these  early  postwar  years,  Germany's  prewar sover- 
eignty  was gradually restored as it reintegrated with the rest of Europe. 
In  1957  the  Treaty  of  Rome  established  the  European  Economic 
Community  (EEC),  which  has subsequently  expanded  to the present 
fifteen-member  European Union  (EU),  with the broad purpose of fur- 
thering economic  cooperation  and integration. The EEC made the first 
attempts to coordinate exchange rates among the nations of Europe and, 
though repeatedly  frustrated by events,  in  1979 established  the Euro- 
pean Monetary System (EMS),  which became the immediate precursor 
to EMU.  In Obstfeld's  view,  the EMS represented the first instance of 
true coordination because it made exchange  rate alignments a matter of 
group discussion  and decision.  It led to the removal of capital controls, 
which,  in turn, required more cooperative intervention among members 
and tied monetary policies  more closely  to exchange  rate targets. 
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of the early  1980s,  the drive to EMU began in the late  1980s with the 
Delors  Report,  which  set out both the goal  of a single  currency and a 
process  for reaching that goal.  The process  was  made highly  specific 
in the Maastricht treaty of  1991,  which detailed the nature of the new 
European Central Bank (ECB),  set the criteria for membership by in- 
dividual  nations,  outlined  a  proposed  Stabilization  Plan  that  would 
govern  fiscal policy  in the EMU,  and established  a timetable for com- 
pleting  the union.  The next steps are scheduled  for spring 1998,  when 
the initial  membership  will  be decided,  the stabilization  rules will  be 
established,  the leadership of the ECB will be chosen  and its relation- 
ship  to  governments  finalized,  and the  conversion  rates  of  member 
currencies into euro will be set. 
The  choice  of  nations  for the  first wave  of  membership  has been 
contentious,  especially  as Germany has resisted the inclusion  of Italy. 
Obstfeld notes that the decisions  will have to adhere to objective criteria 
if  they  are to  gain  wide  acceptance,  and that those  criteria will  also 
provide the precedent for the admission of new members in the future. 
Since all potential members are sure to meet the criteria for interest rate 
and inflation rate convergence,  deficit  and debt ratios are the two po- 
tential grounds for their rejection.  Although  Italy is vulnerable on its 
projected deficit-to-GDP  ratio,  so  are France and Germany,  and thus 
Obstfeld finds it unlikely  that Italy can be excluded  from the first-wave 
countries.  He  warns,  however,  that there is  still  a small  chance  that 
Germany's Constitutional Court could prevent German entry even after 
the EU has made its decision,  on the grounds that a loose  interpretation 
of the deficit criterion violates  the German constitution. 
Obstfeld  evaluates  the  arguments  in  favor  of  monetary  union  for 
Europe.  He judges  that the saving  in transactions costs  is meaningful 
though modest,  and that the efficiency  gains  to trade and investment 
from avoiding  short-term exchange  rate volatility  are minor.  He also 
reasons that EMU  would  reduce the risk that exchange  rate volatility 
disrupt Europe's drive to deeper market integration. Finally,  he credits 
the prospect of  EMU  with contributing to the elimination  of  inflation 
in several countries that aspire to membership and facilitating desirable 
economic  and institutional reforms. He sees the single currency and the 
prospect that the ECB will  keep inflation in check as cementing  these 
gains. 
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stabilization  problems that individual  nations may confront when they 
give  up exchange  rate and monetary autonomy.  If economic  shocks to 
supply or demand were always  common  to all EMU member nations, 
having a common  currency would be little different from having indi- 
vidual  currencies.  But with asymmetric  shocks,  a common  monetary 
policy  will  compromise  the needs  of  individual  nations.  As  Obstfeld 
notes,  if  a country  falls  into  recession  while  growth  remains  strong 
elsewhere,  it cannot depreciate or lower interest rates to spur demand. 
If its  fiscal  policy  is  constrained  by  the EMU  stabilization  rules,  its 
scope  for reacting  to shocks  is further reduced.  And the ECB cannot 
respond to shocks in individual nations, because its monetary policy  is 
geared to price stability  in the union as a whole.  Under these circum- 
stances,  the adjustment of  an individual  economy  could  be painfully 
slow,  and the country could  suffer  protracted periods  of  high  unem- 
ployment  relative to the EMU average. 
How serious such problems will be will depend on the prevalence of 
asymmetric shocks and on the degree to which other mechanisms,  such 
as  labor mobility  and wage  and price flexibility,  can accomplish  the 
needed  adjustment.  Obstfeld  finds that the empirical research on eco- 
nomic  shocks  in Europe has reached no widely  accepted  verdict,  and 
he notes that in any case,  history may provide little guidance,  because 
it was generated under very different policy  regimes.  In the past, some 
shocks  may have originated from changes  in other European exchange 
rates, as will no longer be possible  among EMU members, or from the 
actions of labor unions or governments,  whose behavior may be differ- 
ent under the EMU  regime.  But he believes  that there are sure to be 
some asymmetric shocks,  and finds little comfort in the strength of the 
adjustment mechanisms  that will  remain under EMU.  Labor mobility 
is extremely  limited  among  European countries  and is unlikely  to in- 
crease.  And wage  and price rigidity  is a long-standing  feature of  Eu- 
ropean economies.  While some are optimistic that wage-price flexibility 
will  increase  once  the  possibility  of  currency  realignment  is  gone, 
Obstfeld is skeptical.  He notes that rigidities have not eased in the face 
of  persistent  regional  disparities  in  unemployment  within  countries, 
including the marked disparities between eastern and western Germany 
since reunification. 
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which final decisions  will be made in spring 1998. In its strongest form, 
an EMU limit on the ratio of a nation's deficit to its GDP could eliminate 
even the automatic stabilizers of a neutral budget policy,  forcing nations 
to cut spending or raise taxes during recessions.  And if the EMU budget 
rules did permit automatic stabilizers,  they could  still prevent the use 
of active fiscal policy  in an environment where other stabilization, mea- 
sures were unavailable.  Alongside  these  stabilization  concerns,  Obst- 
feld  discusses  several  arguments that have been  advanced in favor of 
strong fiscal restraints. He notes that while  market discipline  on indi- 
vidual nations' debt issuance should in principle provide fiscal restraint, 
direct  constraints,  if  effective,  would  be  more predictable  and have 
desirable effects.  Most obvious,  they would frustrate the political  ten- 
dency  of some  countries to run chronic large deficits.  While presently 
this is a problem only for the country with the deficit,  some believe  that 
under EMU this tendency could affect other member nations, either by 
undermining the anti-inflation commitment of monetary policy,  despite 
the  charge  of  the  ECB,  or by  requiring bailouts  in the  event  that a 
nation's  debt  became  unmarketable.  Other possible  effects  of  fiscal 
constraints are less  direct.  In a floating rate system,  countries may be 
deterred from fiscal expansion by the fear of appreciating their curren- 
cies,  but under EMU this brake on fiscal deficits  will  be gone.  Also, 
some argue that fiscal restraints would force countries to scale back the 
overgenerous  social benefit programs that now impede wage flexibility 
and mobility  in the labor market. 
Obstfeld doubts that fiscal restraints imposed under the EMU stabi- 
lization  pact could  help to bring about such useful  changes  in budget 
priorities,  and is  even  skeptical  about whether the deficit  reductions 
that have been made in order to qualify for EMU membership will  be 
maintained. He cites recent research showing that some forms of deficit 
reduction tend to be durable while  other forms-in  particular, cuts in 
investment outlays or increases  in taxes-are  frequently reversed.  Ex- 
amining  the  steps  that the  potential  member nations  have  taken,  he 
concludes  that several of these countries will confront difficult budget 
decisions  if they are to stay within the presently anticipated deficit limits 
once EMU is under way.  If economies  grow slowly  in the first years of 
EMU,  he predicts that members will  quarrel over the implementation 
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that threaten popular social programs. With such problems in view,  the 
particulars of  the stability  pact will  be hotly  debated in spring  1998, 
before a final agreement is reached. 
Not all European countries will be in the first wave of EMU entrants. 
Obstfeld examines  the options  open to the outsiders.  A new exchange 
rate mechanism,  ERM2,  will provide a vehicle  for pegging  to the euro, 
as a way for those  who desire entry at a later date to meet the conver- 
gence  criteria.  ERM2 will  thus also discourage  big  shifts  in competi- 
tiveness  between  outsiders  and EMU  members.  However,  while  the 
rules relating ERM2 and EMU provide for intervention to keep curren- 
cies  within a band around the euro,  they can be suspended in a crisis, 
which reduces the attractiveness of joining the new exchange rate mech- 
anism in the first place. Obstfeld notes that outsiders have other options. 
They may choose  the Anglo-Swedish  model of inflation targeting as an 
alternative to pegging  to the euro. That raises the issue of whether some 
of EMU 's "ins"  may choose to become "outs"  because of a perception 
that EMU is impeding their economic  performance.  There are no pro- 
visions  for  seceding,  and a  nation  that chose  to  do  so  would  incur 
unpredictable diplomatic and financial costs,  but Obstfeld does not rule 
out the possibility. 
The  worry that stabilization  of  national  economies  will  be  under- 
mined by EMU is questioned  at a fundamental level  by some analysts. 
They reason that little is lost in going to a single currency because,  with 
Europe's rigid real wages,  depreciating a nominal exchange rate merely 
changes  all prices in proportion, adding to inflation without any effect 
on real outcomes.  Obstfeld  challenges  this model  by noting that even 
moderate degrees of nominal wage and price rigidity, which he believes 
characterize  actual market economies,  make revaluation  a useful  op- 
tion.  He  demonstrates  the  effects  of  such  nominal  rigidities,  using 
sticky  price models  of  adjustment for an open economy.  The key pa- 
rameters are the degree of indexing of nominal wages to prices and the 
sensitivity  of the expected  real wage to unemployment.  In the simplest 
case,  when  wage  indexing  is incomplete,  nominal devaluation  imme- 
diately  offsets  the  unemployment  effect  of  a negative  employment 
shock,  although it does not avoid deterioration in the terms of trade. In 
more elaborate models,  in which unions resist the decline in real wages, 
adjustment is  more gradual and the economy's  path depends  on how 
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adjust  to  unemployment.  Obstfeld  presents  regression  estimates  at- 
tempting  to characterize  actual European adjustment experience,  but 
finds  no  useful  generalizations  about the key  parameters.  While  ac- 
knowledging  that history could be a poor guide in a new single currency 
regime,  based  on  all  the available  evidence  he judges  that exchange 
rate flexibility  can provide important help in adjusting to shocks. 
Obstfeld  concludes  that EMU  faces  significant  hurdles.  The broad 
membership that now seems  likely  will be vulnerable to more disputes 
and more asymmetric shocks than a narrow union would have been.  He 
notes  that there are still  important matters to settle,  such as the com- 
position of the ECB's  governing body and the terms of the stabilization 
agreement.  While the case for EMU is both political  and economic,  he 
suggests  that the project will  rise or fall on the basis of  its economic 
results. In particular, if the EU countries that do not join prosper relative 
to those  that form its initial  membership,  EMU could  fall apart, with 
consequences  that are hard to predict. However,  if EMU succeeds  eco- 
nomically,  he believes  that it will advance the cause of European unity 
and generate social  and political  benefits,  as its proponents claim. 
The two formal commentators on Obstfeld's  paper express  stronger 
reservations  about EMU.  Richard Cooper  endorses  the concept  of  a 
single  currency for Europe, but argues that the arrangements for stabi- 
lization under EMU are inadequate. He reasons that the fiscal tightening 
that is currently being imposed is counterproductive in some countries 
and the fiscal rules contemplated for the future monetary union are too 
inflexible.  He is even  more concerned  that the new European central 
bank would be unaccountable to any government,  unlike the U.S.  and 
German central banks,  which,  while  meaningfully  independent  from 
political  pressure,  are nonetheless  part of  a broader political  process 
and  ultimately  accountable  to  their  legislatures.  Alberto  Alesina  is 
highly  skeptical  of  economic  prospects  under EMU.  He reasons  that 
Europe  is  far from  an optimal  currency  area and questions  whether 
monetary union would facilitate useful institutional reforms in member 
nations.  He believes  that labor unions  and other politically  important 
elements  would resist the pressures for change that are likely  to arise, 
aggravating social tensions and political conflicts both within and across 
countries.  On balance,  he regards EMU as a gamble not worth taking. 